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Public Regulatory Reform and Management Earnings Forecasts in a Low Private 
Litigation Environment 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of continuous disclosure regulatory reform on the likelihood, 
frequency and qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts issued in New 
Zealand’s low private litigation environment. Using a sample of 720 earnings forecasts issued 
by 94 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange before and after the reform (1999 to 2005), 
we provide strong evidence of significant changes in forecasting behaviour in the post-reform 
period. Specifically, firms were more likely to issue earnings forecasts to pre-empt earnings 
announcements and, in contrast to findings in other legal settings, those earnings forecasts 
exhibited higher frequency and improved qualitative characteristics (better precision and 
accuracy). An important implication of our findings is that public regulatory reforms may 
have a greater benefit in a low private litigation environment and thus add to the global debate 
about the effectiveness of alternative public regulatory reforms of corporate requirements. 
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1 Introduction 
In the wake of the global financial crisis the calls for greater public enforcement of corporate 
behaviour despite the lack of empirical evidence of the effectiveness of such regulatory 
intervention have amplified (Sacasa, 2008). However, recent regulatory reforms in the United 
States (the U.S.), such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, have been criticised on the basis of 
imposing significantly high costs on firms, especially when private enforcement through 
shareholder litigation may in some cases provide more efficient solutions than regulatory 
reform (Pasha, 2006). There has also been criticism of the effectiveness of private 
enforcement in the U.S. by researchers who suggest that high litigation costs associated with 
private enforcement have a negative impact on corporate behaviour (Rogers and Buskirk, 
2009).1 
A major impediment to investigating the relative merits of public enforcement versus private 
enforcement is the difficulty associated with isolating the separate impact of incremental 
public enforcement reform and private litigation. This is especially the case in the U.S. where 
the threat of both public and private enforcement is high. It may be possible that the net 
benefits from public enforcement are more easily identifiable where there is little private 
enforcement. 
Similar to the other low private litigation environments, such as Australia and Canada, the 
effectiveness of private litigation taken by shareholders and others in New Zealand is 
impaired by the combination of high costs, a onerous burden of individual reliance proof and 
damages determined by judges rather than juries resulting in low damage awards (Macfarlane, 
2008). This low private litigation environment is further exaggerated in New Zealand where 
contingent fees and alternative funding are prohibited. This results in the need for up-front 
                                                 
1 Rogers and Buskirk (2009) find that high private litigation costs in the U.S. discourage good faith disclosures 
which they argue to be inconsistent with the belief that private enforcement enhances corporate transparency. 
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payments for litigation and an anti-litigious culture unique to New Zealand.2 Therefore, the 
New Zealand context provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of incremental 
regulatory reform in a very low litigation environment with the absence of any viable private 
enforcement. 
The Securities Markets Act 1988 was amended in 2002 as part of a broad reform of securities 
regulation in New Zealand to include statutory sanctions to support the New Zealand 
Exchange (NZX)’s continuous disclosure listing rules. The suggestion that New Zealand 
should follow the U.S. by instituting quarterly reporting was rejected. It was decided that it 
would be better for New Zealand to harmonise with Australia with the adoption of a 
mandatory continuous disclosure regime. 
The amended Act requires NZX-listed firms to disclose any material information to investors 
as they arise. Failure to comply with the amended Act, and/or orders made by the Securities 
Commission in relation to continuous disclosure, can lead to civil penalties of up to $300,000 
and criminal penalties of up to $30,000. The effectiveness of this reform has been questioned 
due to the lack of strong enforcement exercised by the NZX and the Securities Commission.3 
Several New Zealand studies provide empirical evidence that suggests that this regulatory 
intervention has been effective. Studies addressing the capital market impacts of this reform 
document that the information component of the bid-ask spread for less liquid stocks, the 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and the stock market reaction to earnings 
announcements and earnings forecasts, all decreased in the post-reform period (Frijns et al., 
2008; Dunstan et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2009). Huang et al. (2009) investigate the impact of 
                                                 
2 This anti-litigious culture is exemplified by the inception of the accident compensation scheme (1974), which 
bars any compensation for personal injuries or death (Todd, 2005). While this disallowance to sue for personal 
injuries or death does not impact on the rights of investors to sue for financial losses, this means that there are 
very few incidences of high damage awards to encourage litigation. 
3 To date, there are only a few instances of enforcement of the continuous disclosure requirements. These 
enforcements include RetailX Limited (Plus SMS Holdings Limited), Feltex Carpets Limited, Oyster Bay 
Marlborough Vineyards Limited, Media Technology Group Limited and Strategic Finance Limited. 
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this reform on corporate behaviour and find that firms increased the number of price-sensitive 
disclosures released to the market and improved the timeliness of their earnings 
announcements. Our study extends these studies by investigating the impact of this reform on 
the likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts.4 
The focus on management earnings forecasts provides the opportunity to examine one aspect 
of corporate disclosure which has been shown to be significant through the reduction of 
information asymmetry (Coller and Yohn, 1997) and cost of capital (Botosan, 1997) and the 
facilitation of  “clarity and understanding” by investors (Graham et al., 2005). In the area of 
corporate disclosure research, researchers have been attracted to the study of management 
earnings forecasts because they have a number of desirable properties that make them a 
superior disclosure proxy (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). First, 
unlike one-off price sensitive events such as merger proposals, management earnings 
forecasts are generally applicable to all firms and can be readily evaluated ex post through 
periodic financial reports. Second, firms have discretion regarding the decision to provide 
earnings forecasts, the number and qualitative characteristics of earnings forecasts made 
which provide rich insights into the disclosure behaviour. In this study, management earnings 
forecasts are a good indicator to measure the impact of this reform because the NZX 
specifically requires the disclosure of a material change in a listed firm’s financial forecast or 
expectation under its continuous disclosure rules.5 
We examine the changes in the likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics (horizon, 
precision and accuracy) of management earnings forecasts, before and after the reform, using 
                                                 
4 We define management earnings forecasts as all managerial disclosures predicting earnings prior to the release 
of corresponding earnings announcements. 
5 Under the NZX Listing Rule 10 Disclosure and Information, management earnings forecasts and any expected 
changes thereto are the first mentioned as important and relevant. While the NZX has recognised that there are 
situations where firms should legally be allowed to withhold material information by including the carve-out 
provisions, a firm is still required to release specific information when an earnings change is probable and/or it is 
necessary to prevent the development of a false market in a firm’s securities. 
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a sample of 720 management earnings forecasts provided by 94 NZX-listed firms during the 
31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005 financial reporting periods. Our results provide strong 
evidence of changes in management earnings forecast behaviour in the post-reform period 
after controlling for time-series dependency and firm-specific characteristics (i.e. firm 
performance, firm size, cross-listing status and growth prospects). Overall, firms were more 
likely to pre-empt earnings announcements with an earnings forecasts, and forecasting firms 
provided a greater number of earnings forecasts in the post-reform period. Further, firms were 
more likely to provide their earnings forecasts as non-routine disclosures after the reform.6 
Firms tended to delay the release of their earnings forecasts that might lead to the 
improvement in forecast precision and accuracy. Both forecast precision and accuracy have 
significantly improved after the reform became effective. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, published prior research on 
continuous disclosure has not studied such a comprehensive number of management earnings 
forecast characteristics before and after the introduction of statutory sanctions for continuous 
disclosure rules in a low private litigation environment. Second, our findings add to the 
evidence that the enhancement of public enforcement in New Zealand has had a positive 
impact on capital market characteristics and corporate behaviour. Third, our evidence 
contradicts the findings of the extant literature by failing to indentify an asymmetric treatment 
of good and bad earnings news. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises relevant disclosure 
and management earnings forecast literature and describes the research hypotheses. An 
                                                 
6  Firms may release earnings forecasts via routine events such as mandatory periodic financial reports, 
chairman’s addresses at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) and letters to shareholders. Firm may alternatively 
release earnings forecasts via non-routine events at anytime throughout the year (Chan et al., 2007). The timely 
release of non-routine earnings forecasts ensures a fully informed market; therefore, the change in the likelihood 
and frequency of non-routine management earnings forecasts provides further evidence for the impact of this 
continuous disclosure reform on management earnings forecast behaviour. 
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overview of the research design is provided in section 3. Section 4 presents the results and the 
study concludes in section 5. 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The disclosure literature7 suggests that managers’ decisions to disclose information, including 
earnings forecasts8, can involve significant benefits (i.e. less information asymmetry, lower 
cost of capital and better “clarity and understanding” by investors) as well as costs (i.e. 
proprietary, litigation and reputation costs). Therefore, managers will balance these benefits 
and costs in deciding the optimal level of disclosure for their firms. The intervention of a 
public regulatory reform will act as an external shock to this disclosure equilibrium. The 
impact of this type of shock will vary depending on the type of regulatory reform involved 
and other environmental factors including the current effectiveness of existing private 
enforcement. 
The strong culture of private litigation prevailing in the U.S. means that the effectiveness of a 
public regulatory reform on corporate disclosure behaviour may be either diminished or 
augmented by the threat of strong private enforcement. Two important U.S. public reforms 
which have been investigated by researchers are the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
1995 (PSLRA) and the Regulation Fair Disclosure 2000 (Reg FD).9 Johnson et al. (2001) 
examine the impact of the PSLRA on management earnings forecasts. These authors were 
concerned that there may be a negative impact from the extended safe harbour provided 
which could protect firms from litigation due to providing inaccurate earnings forecasts. 
However, they failed to find empirical evidence that there had been negative impact on the 
                                                 
7 See Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) for reviews of the disclosure literature. 
8 See Cameron (1986), King et al. (1990) and Hirst et al. (2008) for reviews of the management earnings 
forecast literature. 
9 The PSLRA introduces a statutory “safe harbour” for forward-looking statements provided in good faith and 
the Reg FD effectively bans firms from selectively disclosing information. 
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quantity and quality of management earnings forecasts. Other authors examining the Reg FD 
also had concerns that there might be an unintended negative impact on corporate disclosure 
behaviour. Specifically, there might be an information-chilling effect where firms might 
become reluctant to publicly disclose information for fear of litigation as these public 
disclosures might be later used against them. Again, their empirical findings do not support 
this information-chilling expectation as they find no discernable negative impact of the reform 
on the level of voluntary disclosure (Bailey et al., 2003; Heflin et al., 2003). An exception 
from these findings is provided by Wang (2007) who finds that firms with lower information 
asymmetry and higher proprietary information costs did reduce their level of voluntary 
disclosure in response to the imposition of the Reg FD. These empirical findings suggest that 
in the U.S. the extent of a firm’s exposure to private litigation risk is an important determinant 
of corporate disclosure strategies even where there has been a significant regulatory reform. 
In Australia, where private litigation risk has traditionally been lower than in the U.S., it is 
possible that the threat of private enforcement has less impact on the corporate reaction to 
public reforms. Research findings are generally supportive of a positive impact on corporate 
disclosure behaviour as the strength of public enforcement increases over time. Brown et al. 
(1999) examine the capital market impact of the Australian continuous disclosure reform and 
find that there was an increase in the frequency of price-sensitive disclosures made by firms 
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). However, the increase was confined to 
smaller firms and for those that were more likely to reveal bad news. In a later study, Chan et 
al. (2007) contend that the increased enforcement action by the ASIC in relation to the 
Australian continuous disclosure reform significantly increased the level of non-routine 
earnings forecasts in the period after 1 January 2000. However, their findings are mainly 
driven by bad news non-routine earnings forecasts. These consistent asymmetric findings 
between bad and good news firms in both Brown et al. (1999) and Chan et al. (2007), which 
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are similar to most prior U.S. disclosure research (e.g. Skinner, 1994), are interesting given 
the fact that Australia also has relatively low private litigation risk compared to that of the 
U.S.10 
New Zealand researchers have examined the impact of public reforms on corporate disclosure 
behaviour in their low private litigation environment. Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) 
investigate the effect of the Financial Reporting Act 1993 on the mandatory disclosure 
practices of NZX-listed firms. They provide strong evidence that the statutory backing of 
financial reporting standards enhances the quality of corporate disclosure compliance. The 
impact of the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002 was examined by Huang et al. (2009). 
They find that firms released a greater number of price-sensitive disclosures to the market in 
the post-reform period. 
The intention of the continuous disclosure reform in New Zealand is to create a fully 
informed environment where firms update the market with all material information on a 
timely basis (Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002, Section 19A). Given the prevailing 
weakness of private enforcement in New Zealand, the threat of more severe sanctions for not 
continually updating the market with material information may be expected to be sufficient to 
drive firms to adjust their disclosure strategies, including the release of earnings forecasts. If 
firms respond to the threat of increased public enforcement provided by this reform, we 
expect to observe an increase in both the likelihood of firms providing earnings forecasts and 
the number of earnings forecasts released by each firm to the NZX in the post-reform period. 
The effectiveness of this reform has been challenged due to little evidence of strong 
enforcement by either the NZX or the Securities Commission. Penalties for breaches of the 
                                                 
10 This empirical evidence is contrary to expectations that the asymmetric treatment of bad and good news would 
not prevail in the low private litigation environment of Australia. Further evidence of the anomalous asymmetric 
treatment of news content is observed in the studies by Gallery et al. (2002) and Gallery et al. (2010). 
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continuous disclosure requirements have not extended beyond public censure and/or NZX 
fines and none has led to further action by the Securities Commission. Generally, if a firm is 
queried for a suspected failure to comply with continuous disclosure rules and is required to 
issue new information by the NZX and/or the Securities Commission, there is a low 
likelihood of further action.11  Further weakness of this reform was that the liability for 
continuous disclosure breaches lay only against the firm concerned, not its directors or 
officers.12 This created an irony in the case of a firm in liquidation, as further action would 
mean fines against aggrieved shareholders for breaches of regulations designed to protect the 
interests of the shareholders.13 
Given this lack of enforcement, it could be argued that the Act’s provisions are merely 
corrective, rather than punitive or preventive (McGill, 2004). However, it cannot be assumed 
that earlier non-compliance is due to weak enforcement power. There may be a learning effect 
associated with the reform. Anecdotal evidence indicates that firms were struggling with 
interpreting and meeting the continuous disclosure requirements (Gaynor, 2003). With respect 
to management earnings forecasts, Gaynor (2003) suggests three factors, which effectively 
deter firms from forecasting earnings on a timely basis. First, firms are reluctant to provide 
downward earnings forecast revisions until the last moment due to either the hope of a 
turnaround to be achieved or to avoid unnecessary negative reaction by investors. Second, 
firms have difficulty in distinguishing between an aberration and a trend in sales and earnings. 
Third, firms may find it difficult to provide earnings forecasts outside their normal half-yearly 
budget cycle. 
                                                 
11 To date, only the NZX has publicly acted on continuous disclosure breaches possibly because under the 
Memorandum of Understanding with the NZX, the Securities Commission will only intervene where it is 
unsatisfied with the NZX’s resolution. 
12 This impediment has been effectively resolved from 29 February 2008 with the amendments to the continuous 
disclosures in the Securities Markets Act, which give the Securities Commission the power to seek pecuniary 
penalties and compensation from individual directors or officers involved in any continuous disclosure breaches. 
13 Refer to the Securities Commission’s decision on the cases of Feltex Carpets Limited and Plus SMS Holdings 
Limited where they provide this as the explanation for lack of further action. 
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Due to the strength of views regarding the likely impact of the reform, we state our 
hypotheses regarding the forecast likelihood and frequency in the null form. 
H1: There is no change in the likelihood that firms issue management earnings 
forecasts (overall and non-routine) in the post-reform period. 
H2: There is no change in the frequency of management earnings forecasts 
(overall and non-routine) issued by firms in the post-reform period. 
Following the decision to release the earnings forecasts to the market, firms must then decide 
on the qualitative characteristics of the earnings forecasts they are reporting (King et al., 
1990). Three key qualitative characteristics of earnings forecasts are forecast horizon, forecast 
precision and forecast accuracy (Hirst et al., 2008).14 
Prior research on management earnings forecasts documents significant variation in forecast 
characteristics across different jurisdictions which might be explained by differences in 
private litigation risk. Specifically, there is consistent evidence that firms from lower private 
litigation risk countries are more likely to provide more timely and more precise earnings 
forecasts (Baginski et al., 2002; Frost, 2004). Interestingly, while prior research consistently 
shows that forecast precision is lower in countries with higher private litigation risks, Chan et 
al. (2007) find forecast precision has increased after an increase in enforcement threats in 
Australia. In addition, Japanese firms consistently issued over-optimistic earnings forecasts as 
they face no obvious legal sanctions (Kato et al., 2009). 
Consistent with the regulatory intention of creating a more informed market, we would expect 
that if the reform has been effective, firms will improve the quality of their disclosure. 
However, critics of the reform and its apparent lack of enforcement do not expect to see 
                                                 
14 Forecast horizon, precision and accuracy capture the timeliness, specificity and accuracy of the firms’ earnings 
forecasts, respectively. 
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changes in the qualitative characteristics of firms’ earnings forecasts. Also, prior research 
documents the trade-off between forecast horizon and forecast precision and accuracy (Hirst 
et al., 2008). Therefore, it is difficult to predict the impact of the reform on forecast horizon 
and its subsequent impact on forecast precision and accuracy. 
Given the ambiguity about how the reform has impacted on the qualitative characteristics of 
earnings forecasts: horizon, precision and accuracy. We again state our hypotheses in the null 
form. 
H3: There is no change in the horizon of management earnings forecasts issued 
by firms in the post-reform period. 
H4: There is no change in the precision of management earnings forecasts issued 
by firms in the post-reform period. 
H5: There is no change in the accuracy of management earnings forecasts issued 
by firms in the post-reform period. 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Study Period and Sample 
The selected study period is an eight-year period encompassing all announcements made by 
firms regarding the financial years ending between 31 January 1999 and 31 December 2005. 
This period is approximately four and a half years before and three and a half years after the 
reform’s enforcement date of 1 December 2002. The study period avoids any contamination 
that may arise from the introduction of the Securities Legislation Bill in early 2006. All NZX-
listed firms that survive at least for the period from 28 September 1999 to 13 September 2004 
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are included in the sample. As detailed in Table 1, this selection process identifies 94 firms 
with 24,243 announcements to the NZX containing 720 earnings forecasts.15 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.2 Data Sources and Classification of Management Earnings Forecasts 
The NZX listing status is extracted from the Company Information section of the IRG 
database. The cross-listing status and listing date information are taken directly from NZX 
helpline services. Earnings and other financial accounting information are obtained from the 
Datastream database or the Financial Information section of the IRG database. All disclosure 
data are extracted from announcements recorded in the Company Announcements section of 
the IRG database. 
The identified earnings forecasts are coded according to the underlying event (routine or non-
routine) associated with the announcements. Routine event announcements are defined as 
periodic announcements common to all firms required under the NZX listing rules or are in 
common practice. They include all mandatory periodic financial reports (e.g. preliminary 
final, annual, half-yearly and quarterly reports) and other periodic releases associated with 
repetitive events (e.g. chairman’s addresses at the AGM, letters to shareholders). All other 
announcements are considered non-routine events. Earnings forecasts are further classified 
according to their content (bad, neutral and good news), horizon, precision (qualitative, open-
ended, range and point estimates) and accuracy. 
Earnings forecasts are classified as good (bad) news if the content reveals favourable 
(unfavourable) earnings prospects relative to the previous earnings announcement or the most 
recent earnings forecast if one has been provided since the previous earnings announcement. 
                                                 
15 All 24,243 announcements are carefully read to identify announcements containing earnings forecasts. These 
720 earnings forecasts include both forecasts of half-yearly and annual earnings. 
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Earnings forecasts are coded as neutral if the forecast indicates no expected change in 
earnings. 
Forecast horizon captures the timeliness of the earnings forecasts. Assuming that the earnings 
forecasts are accurate, a longer forecast horizon provides investors with information on a 
timelier basis. We follow Baginski et al. (2002) by defining forecast horizon as the number of 
calendar days until financial year-end, regardless of whether the earnings forecast is related to 
half-yearly or annual period. 
Forecast precision is defined as the level of specificity in the earnings forecasts. We follow 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) by using an ordinal coding scheme where precision is coded as 0, 1, 2 
and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range and point estimates, respectively. Qualitative 
forecasts are those where firms provide a general impression (non-numeric) expectation about 
performance (e.g. we expect improved earnings performance this year). Open-ended forecasts 
are forecasts where firms specify a lower or an upper bound for the expected firm 
performance (e.g. profit will be greater than $5 million or profit will be lower than $2 
million). Range forecasts contain a numerical range of expected firm performance (e.g. profit 
will be between $1.1 and $1.3 million). Point forecasts are the most specific, indicating a 
single numerical figure about expected performance (e.g. profit will be $1.2 million). 
Forecast error is employed to measure the accuracy level of range and point earnings 
forecasts. Consistent with Ajinkya et al. (2005), we define forecast error as the absolute value 
of the difference between forecasted and actual earnings deflated by share price at the 
beginning of the financial year. 
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3.3 Hypothesis Testing Procedures 
The hypotheses are tested using univariate methods, and due to the expected interactions 
across constructs, multivariate methods are employed to jointly test the hypotheses and to 
control for firm-specific and forecast-specific characteristics expected to impact on forecast 
likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics of earnings forecasts. In the multivariate 
procedures, we estimate random effects logistic/Poisson/linear16, multinomial and ordered 
logit regression models to make inferences about the hypothesised relationships and to control 
for firm-specific attributes, heterogeneity bias and non-independence across observations. The 
model specifications are as follows. 
FCAST1i,t/FCAST2i,t = a0 + a1REFORMi,t + a2ECSIGNi,t + a3ECHANGEi,t + a4SIZEi,t + 
a5XLISTi,t + a6MVBVi,t  + αi,t         (1) 
FNUM1i,t/FNUM2i,t = b0 + b1REFORMi,t + b2ECSIGNi,t + b3ECHANGEi,t + b4SIZEi,t + 
b5XLISTi,t + b6MVBVi,t +βi,t         (2) 
FHORIZONi,t = c0 + c1REFORMi,t + c2BADi,t + c3GOODi,t + c4ECHANGEi,t + c5SIZEi,t + 
c6XLISTi,t + c7MVBVi,t + c8FNUM1i,t + γi,t       (3) 
PRECISE1i,t = d0 + d1REFORMi,t + d2BADi,t + d3GOODi,t + d4ECHANGEi,t + d5SIZEi,t + 
d6XLISTi,t + d7MVBVi,t + d8NREVENTi,t + d9FHORIZONi,t + µi,t    (4) 
ERRORi,t = e0 + e1REFORMi,t + e2BADi,t + e3GOODi,t + e4ECHANGEi,t + e5SIZEi,t + 
e6XLISTi,t + e7MVBVi,t + e8PRECISE2i,t +e9FHORIZONi,t + θi,t    (5) 
where: 
FCAST1 = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year’s 
earnings announcement is pre-empted by at least one earnings forecast and 0 
otherwise. 
FCAST2 = an ordinal variable taking the value of 2, 1 and 0 if the current financial year’s 
earnings announcement is pre-empted by, at least a non-routine earnings forecast, 
exclusively routine earnings forecast, or no earnings forecast, respectively. 
FNUM1 = the number of earnings forecasts released between the actual release dates of the 
mandatory earnings announcements for the prior and the current year. 
FNUM2 = the number of non-routine earnings forecasts released between the actual release 
dates of the mandatory earnings announcements for the prior and the current 
year. 
                                                 
16 For the linear regression model, the results from a random effects/fixed effects/OLS regression model are 
reported depending on the results of the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier and Hausman tests. 
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FHORIZON 
= 
the number of calendar days between the release date of the first earnings 
forecast and the corresponding financial reporting date. 
PRECISE1 = the level of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2 and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, 
range and point forecasts, respectively. PRECISE2 (in model 5) takes the value 
of 0 and 1 for range and point earnings forecasts, respectively. 
ERROR = the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the forecast error measured by the 
difference between forecasted and actual earnings deflated by share price at the 
beginning of the financial year. Only the last range and point forecasts for the 
period are used.17 
REFORM = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in 
the post-reform period and 0 otherwise. Significant coefficients of this variable 
for models 1 to 5 will provide evidence on the hypothesised relationships. 
ECSIGN = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period 
earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. 
BAD = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast indicates an 
expected negative change in current year earnings and 0 otherwise (good and 
neutral forecasts). 
GOOD = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 of the earnings forecast indicates an 
expected positive change in current year earnings and 0 otherwise (bad and 
neutral forecasts). 
ECHANGE = the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per 
share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial year.18 
XLIST = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a 
foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. 
MVBV = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity at the end of the current financial year. 
NREVENT = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast is released 
through a non-routine announcement and 0 otherwise. 
 
Models 1 to 5 are used to test the changes in forecast likelihood (H1), frequency (H2), horizon 
(H3), precision (H4) and accuracy (H5) in the post-reform period, respectively. 
The three forecast characteristics FHORIZON, PRECISE1 (PRECISE2), and ERROR have 
been shown to interact with each other 19  (Hirst et al., 2008); therefore, we include 
FHORIZON in model 4 and FHORIZON and PRECISE2 in model 5 as control variables. 
FNUM1 is included in model 3 since the forecast horizon of the first earnings forecast is 
expected to be longer for firm-years where a greater number of earnings forecasts are 
                                                 
17 Consistent with Hirst et al. (2008), the ERROR model only focuses on the range and point earnings forecasts. 
18 Similar results are obtained when we use the market value of equity (MVE) as an alternative size proxy. 
19 Forecast precision and accuracy need to be jointly examined with forecast horizon as there is a potential trade-
off between forecast horizon and forecast precision and accuracy. As more of the financial reporting period 
elapses and less time remains before the release of periodic reports, firms will possess more information and be 
more certain about the eventual outcome. 
 15
observed. The independent variables ECSIGN, BAD, GOOD20, ECHANGE21, SIZE22, and 
MVBV are those that have been commonly used in prior management earnings forecast 
research (Hirst et al., 2008) and control for firm-specific factors that lead to differences in 
forecasting behaviour across firms independently of the existing disclosure regime. Consistent 
with Hossain et al. (1995), the XLIST variable is included as a number of NZX-listed firms 
are cross-listed on the other foreign exchanges where more onerous disclosure rules have 
existed prior to the reform.23 As cross-listed firms are not expected to have significantly 
changed their disclosure strategies in the post-reform period, this group of firms provide a 
natural control from which to compare the impact of the new rules on non-cross-listed firms. 
4 Results 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 displays the number of firm-years where earnings announcements are pre-empted by 
earnings forecasts and extends the analysis to the materiality of earnings changes. Overall, the 
number of firms years pre-empted by at least one earnings forecast has significantly increased 
                                                 
20 Prior research findings on management earnings forecasts are generally consistent with the litigation cost 
hypothesis (Skinner, 1994, 1997). According to this hypothesis, management earnings forecasts are more likely 
to occur when there are large negative earnings surprises in an environment where the private litigation cost is 
high. In support of this hypothesis, Baginski et al. (2002) reveal that Canadian firms, which operated in a less 
litigious environment compared to their U.S. counterparts, released more earnings forecasts when earnings were 
increasing while U.S. firms were relatively more likely to issue earnings forecasts during periods when earnings 
were decreasing. Therefore, we seek to investigate this issue by controlling for the earnings change direction and 
forecast news as any asymmetric treatment of positive and negative earnings expectations would also be 
inconsistent with the provisions of the continuous disclosure reform. 
21 When investors and analysts are surprised by the large earnings changes, firms face greater potential litigation 
and reputation impairment costs; therefore, the magnitude of the expected earnings change is likely to be an 
important factor influencing firms’ disclosure decisions (Kasznik and Lev, 1995). These costs are likely to 
increase after the passage of the regulatory reform. Therefore, we control for the magnitude of earnings changes. 
22 Prior research finds that larger firms issue more management earnings forecasts (Cox, 1985; Waymire, 1985). 
23 For example, the Australian continuous disclosure regime has become increasingly more onerous since 1994 
and the U.S. listing rules require quarterly reporting and Form 8-K filings for certain one-off events. These 
disclosure rules and the associated litigation risk for non-compliance might lead to fewer earnings forecasts and 
observed variation in the qualitative characteristics of these earnings forecasts relative to non-cross-listed firms. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that cross-listed firms exposed to the Australian continuous disclosure system 
have more, not fewer, earnings forecasts. However, after retesting all models excluding those cross-listed on the 
ASX, the results for XLIST remained substantially similar to the main findings. 
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from 163 (47.66%) to 187 (64.48%) (Chi-square = 17.971).24 Interestingly, this increase is 
mainly attributable to firms with positive earnings change below the 10 percent materiality 
threshold and negative earnings change below the 5 percent materiality threshold. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Additionally, Table 3 shows that the change in the forecast likelihood is due to an increase in 
the change in the non-routine forecast likelihood (FCAST2 in Panel A) rather than routine 
forecast likelihood. These results are consistent with Chan et al.'s (2007) Australian findings 
of no increase in routine management earnings forecasts following regulatory changes and 
increased enforcement action.  
Table 3, Panel B indicates a marginal decline in the forecast horizons of the first earnings 
forecasts in the post-reform period.25 Forecast precision has significantly improved with a 
noticeable decline in qualitative forecasts (from 70.1% to 45.35%) and the increase in each of 
the three types of quantitative forecasts (from 7.97% to 11.22%, from 3.65% to 13.60%, and 
from 18.27% to 29.83% for open-ended, range and point forecasts, respectively). As shown in 
Table 3, Panel C, there is also a significant improvement in the accuracy of last range and 
point earnings forecasts with their forecast error declining from a mean of 0.219 to 0.017. 
Table 3, Panel A also presents summary statistics for firm-specific and other forecast 
characteristics used as control variables in the multivariate analysis. With the exception of 
growth prospects (MVBV), earnings change sign (ECSIGN), earnings change magnitude 
(ECHANGE), assets (SIZE) and cross-listing status (XLIST) remained relatively stable and 
insignificantly different across the pre/post-reform periods. In the sample of 720 earnings 
                                                 
24 The average number of overall (non-routine) forecasts has increased from 1.846 to 2.241 (0.258 to 0.529) (see 
Table 3). Also, multiple forecasts increased. Firm-years pre-empted by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 earnings forecasts in 
the pre- (post-) reform period are 71, 58, 23, 10, 1 and 0 (60, 57, 46, 15, 7 and 2), respectively.  
25 As measuring the change in forecast horizon for multiple forecasters is problematic, we only focus on the first 
earnings forecast in the financial year. 
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forecasts, 141 (19.58%) are associated with non-routine announcements which is far greater 
than those produced by Australian firms with an analyst following (Chan et al., 2007). Also, 
the frequency of bad news earnings forecasts (16.94% before and 18.62% after the reform is 
much lower than those reported in other jurisdictions.26 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
The univariate results show that the introduction of the continuous disclosure reform is 
associated with an increase in forecast likelihood, frequency, precision and accuracy, thus 
leading to preliminary rejection of H1, H2, H4 and H5. Despite a marginal decline, the 
forecast horizon statistically remained stable across the reform, which implies that H3 cannot 
be rejected. 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The results from estimating the multiple regression models used to jointly test the 
hypothesised relationships are presented in Tables 4 to 10.27 These are supplemented with 
results from estimating sub-sample models based on the direction of earnings changes 
(negative/positive) and news content (bad/neutral/good news). 
4.2.1 The Likelihood of Firms Issuing Management Earnings Forecasts 
Table 4 reports the results for the FCAST1 model. FCAST1 captures firms’ decision to pre-
empt an earnings announcement with an earnings forecast. The REFORM coefficient is 
significantly positive (p-value < 0.05) in the full sample and the two earnings change sub-
samples. Therefore, H1 is rejected. 
                                                 
26 Chan et al. (2007) document that in Australia, 22.1 percent are bad news and Baginski et al. (2002) show that 
35.1 percent and 35.7 percent are bad news in the U.S. and Canada, respectively. 
27 Prior to estimating the regression models, variables with extreme values were winsorised (to a maximum of 1 
percent of the sample observations). Also, bivariate correlations were conducted and none appear to be 
sufficiently large to suggest multicollinearity. 
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Table 4 also presents the regression results from estimating the multinomial logit model. The 
dependent variable FCAST2 takes the value of 2, 1 or 0 if the current financial year’s earnings 
announcement is pre-empted by, at least one non-routine earnings forecast, exclusively 
routine earnings forecast, or no earnings forecast, respectively. The results again show a 
significant negative REFORM coefficient for the 0/1 comparison for the full sample (p-value 
= 0.029) and negative earnings change sub-sample (p-value = 0.074) and a significant positive 
REFORM coefficient for the 2/1 comparison for the full sample (p-value = 0.000) and 
positive earnings change sub-sample (p-value = 0.000).28 Untabulated results also show a 
significantly positive coefficient for the 2/0 comparison. 
Thus, these results indicate that in the post-reform period, firms were more likely to pre-empt 
their earnings announcements with an earnings forecast (either through routine or non-routine 
announcements) and were more likely to pre-empt through a non-routine than through a 
routine announcement. Therefore, H1 is rejected. 
Further evidence from the FCAST1 model reveals significant coefficients for the firm-specific 
attribute control variables. Larger positive earnings changes are associated with an increased 
likelihood of earnings forecasts. Larger firms were more likely to pre-empt their earnings 
announcements with earnings forecasts which is consistent with Cox (1985) and Waymire 
(1985). Cross-listed firms with positive earnings changes provided fewer earnings forecasts.29 
The results for firm-specific attribute control variables in FCAST2 model are generally similar 
to those reported in FCAST1 model. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
                                                 
28 The FCAST2 results differ from Chan et al. (2007) who document that legislative changes and increased 
enforcement action were followed by a significant increase in the disclosure of only bad news non-routine 
management earnings forecasts. 
29 Further analysis shows that quarterly reporting may have contributed to the lower forecast likelihood for cross-
listed firms as untabulated results reveal a significantly positive relationship between cross-listing status and the 
issuance of quarterly reports. 
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4.2.2 The Frequency of Management Earnings Forecasts Issued by Firms 
Table 5 presents the results for the FNUM1 model. FNUM1 measures the number of earnings 
forecasts released per financial year. The REFORM coefficient is significantly positive for the 
overall sample and the two negative and positive earnings change sub-samples (p-value < 
0.01), thus rejecting H2. Similar results are evident for the FNUM2 model.30 The results 
further indicate that larger firms were more likely to provide more earnings forecasts and 
firms with a greater magnitude of earnings changes provide more non-routine earnings 
forecasts. Also, firms with positive earnings change and more growth prospects tended to 
provide more non-routine earnings forecasts. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.2.3 The Horizon of Management Earnings Forecasts Issued by Firms 
Table 6 provides results from estimating the FHORIZON model. FHORIZON captures the 
timeliness of the first earnings forecast prior to the release of the corresponding earnings 
announcement. The REFORM coefficient is marginally significant (p-value = 0.095) which 
indicates a marginal decline in the timeliness of earnings forecasts following the reform, just 
marginally rejecting H3. None of the earnings news sub-samples supports this finding. The 
finding of a shorter forecast horizon is inconsistent with the expectation that the reform 
improves the timeliness of earnings forecasts. However, if firms are now delaying earnings 
guidance in order to improve other forecast characteristics such as precision and accuracy as 
suggested by Gaynor (2003), the decline in forecast horizon could still be consistent with the 
reform objectives. 
                                                 
30 Untabulated results show that the distributions for FNUM1 and FNUM2 are highly positively skewed. FNUM1 
and FNUM2 clearly do not appear to follow a normal distribution. The Shapiro-Wilk tests also confirm this. 
Therefore a count data model such as Poisson model would be more appropriate for the testing of FNUM1 and 
FNUM2. 
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Table 6 further shows that good news earnings forecasts are marginally associated with longer 
forecast horizon; larger firms with bad and good news tended to delay earnings forecasts; 
cross-listed firms with good news tended to issue earnings forecasts of longer horizon; and 
firms with more growth prospects were more likely to delay the issuance of bad news 
earnings forecasts. As expected the forecast horizon tended to be longer in all three earnings 
news sub-samples where there are a greater number of earnings forecasts issued per financial 
year. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
4.2.4 The Precision of Management Earnings Forecasts 
Table 7 presents results obtained from estimating the forecast precision PRECISE1 model. 
The results reveal a significant positive REFORM coefficient (p-value = 0.000) for the full 
sample indicating that forecast precision has increased after the reform, thus rejecting H4. 
This finding is only supported by the bad and good news earnings forecast sub-samples.31 
Further evidence in Table 7 is the highly negative GOOD coefficient which suggests that 
good news earnings forecasts were less precise than bad or neutral news ones. Firms with 
larger earnings change issued their neutral earnings forecasts in a less precise form. Larger 
firms facing bad news expectations were more likely to release less precise forecasts and 
cross-listed firms with bad and good news tended to issue more precise forecasts. Firms with 
higher growth prospects tended to provide neutral and good news earnings forecasts in a more 
precise form. In addition, earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with non-routine 
announcements and those with shorter horizon tended to be more precise. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
                                                 
31 Similar results are obtained when we collapse PRECISE1 into two categories: qualitative and quantitative 
(open-ended, range and point) earnings forecasts and employ a random effects logit model. 
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4.2.5 The Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts 
Table 8 shows the results from estimating the ERROR model where ERROR captures the 
magnitude of forecast deviation – a measure of forecast accuracy of the last range and point 
earnings forecasts. The results reveal a significant negative REFORM coefficient (p-value = 
0.005), indicating that forecast error has declined following the reform; therefore, H5 is 
rejected. This result is primarily driven by the neutral news sub-sample.32 
Larger expected earnings changes are associated with larger earnings forecast error, except for 
neutral news sub-sample where larger expected earnings changes are associated with smaller 
earnings forecast error. Larger firms were more likely to have smaller forecast errors; 
however, this finding only holds for the full sample and good news sub-sample. Earnings 
forecasts issued by cross-listed firms are associated with larger forecast error for the full 
sample, but not for the sub-samples. Earnings forecasts associated with higher precision level 
(for the full sample and good news sub-sample) and shorter horizon (for the full sample) 
tended to have smaller forecast error. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Ten sensitivity tests are undertaken to ensure the robustness of the results to various 
conditions and alternate specifications of variable constructs. Details of these tests are 
summarised in Table 9. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
                                                 
32 We also examine forecast bias as measured by the signed forecast error and the untabulated results provide no 
evidence of a change in either positive or negative forecast bias in the pre- or post-reform period. 
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Overall, the sensitivity analysis shows that the main findings, with one exception regarding 
model 3 – forecast horizon, are robust to various alternative conditions and specifications. For 
model 3 – forecast horizon, the sensitivity tests to control for prior forecast reputation and to 
exclude ASX-listed firms document no change in forecast horizon after the reform which is 
different from the main findings. 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of our study has been to investigate the impact of the continuous disclosure 
reform on a range of management earnings forecast characteristics: likelihood, frequency, 
horizon, precision and accuracy in New Zealand where a low private litigation environment 
prevails. Using a sample of 720 management earnings forecasts provided by 94 NZX-listed 
firms during the financial reporting periods ending between 31 January 1999 and 31 
December 2005, we provide strong evidence of significant changes in management 
forecasting behaviour in the post-reform period. Specifically, there has been an increase in the 
likelihood that firms issue an earnings forecast (overall and non-routine), the frequency of 
earnings forecasts issued by firms (overall and non-routine), and the precision and the 
accuracy of earnings forecasts. 
Our findings lend support to prior New Zealand evidence that this enhancement of public 
regulation in New Zealand has had a positive impact on corporate behaviour. Given the low 
private litigation environment in New Zealand, it is reasonable to conclude that the changes 
we observe are due to the increase in public regulation inherent in the continuous disclosure 
reform. It is interesting that this public reform has had an impact on corporate behaviour 
given the lack of strong evidence on active enforcement of the reform. A possible 
interpretation is that public regulatory reforms are able to have a greater benefit in 
circumstances where private enforcement is a less viable alternative. If this is so, our findings 
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have implications for other low private litigation jurisdictions and contribute to the debate 
regarding the value of further regulatory reform internationally. 
A further finding of our study is that the changes in forecasting behaviour after the continuous 
disclosure reform in New Zealand were observed for both good and bad news disclosing 
firms. This lack of asymmetric treatment of good and bad news is different from prior 
research on continuous disclosure. For instance, while Brown et al. (1999) find an increase in 
the number of price-sensitive disclosures in the post-reform period only for ASX-listed firms 
with poor share price performance and Chan et al. (2007) document an increase in only bad 
news non-routine management earnings forecasts after an increase in enforcement intensity, 
our study finds that the likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts 
significantly increased in the post-reform period regardless of the direction of earnings 
performance. This apparent difference in research findings between New Zealand and 
Australia may suggest that the private litigation environment in New Zealand could be even 
lower than that of the Australian counterpart. 
The major limitation of this study is the small sample within a small but largely unique 
jurisdiction; therefore, the generalisability of our findings is limited. In addition, given that 
the sample firms must survive a minimum of five years, the results might not be 
representative of firms which did not survive the sample period. 
This study adds to the evidence that firm specific characteristics play an important role in the 
determination of management earnings forecasting behaviour. While we have included 
numerous firm characteristics as control variables, we have not considered and leave open for 
further research the role of corporate governance in determining regulatory compliance 
decisions. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection Procedure 
Selecting criteria Number of observations 
Sample firms  
Total firms listed on NZX as at 3 December 2004 197 
Less firms listed on NZX as at 3 December 2004 without IRG data (44) 
Less firms not surviving at least for the period from 28 September 1999 to 13 September 2004 (59) 
Total firms in the final sample 94 
Sample firm-years and announcements  
Total firm-years by 94 firms 655* 
Less firm-years with missing announcements or unusable earnings data for the firms (23) 
Total firm-years in the final sample 632** 
Total announcements in the final sample 24,243 
Less announcements not containing earnings forecasts (23,523) 
Total announcements containing earnings forecasts in the final sample 720 
* Total firm-years include all firm-years with financial reporting dates ending between 31 January 1999 and 31 December 2005. 
** Among 632 firm-years (342 pre- and 290 post-reform), there are 350 firm-years (163 pre- and 187 post-reform) of which 
earnings announcements are pre-empted by one earnings forecasts. 
 
Table 2 
Earnings Forecasts Classified by Negative and Positive Earnings Change Partitions 
  All Firm-years Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period Difference between Pre- and 
Post-Reform % of Pre-empted 
Firm-years 
Chi-square 
Statistic  Earnings 
Change 
No. of Firm-
years 
No. (%) of Pre-
empted Firm-years 
No. of Firm-
years 
No. (%) of Pre-
empted Firm-years 
No. of Firm-
years 
No. (%) of Pre-
empted Firm-years 
Negative =<-0.1 68 34 (50.00%) 35 16 (45.71%) 33 18 (54.55%) 8.84% 0.530 
 -0.1 to –0.05 42 21 (50.00%) 26 12 (46.15%) 16 9 (56.25%) 10.10% 0.404 
 -0.05 to –0.01 84 47 (55.95%) 50 24 (48.00%) 34 23 (67.65%) 19.65% 3.170^ 
 -0.01 to 0 57 30 (52.63%) 24 9 (37.50%) 33 21 (63.64%) 26.14% 3.807^ 
Positive 0 to 0.01 79 39 (49.37%) 40 16 (40.00%) 39 23 (58.97%) 18.97% 2.844^ 
 0.01 to 0.05 146 92 (63.01%) 76 41 (53.95%) 70 51 (72.86%) 18.91% 5.591* 
 0.05 to 0.1 53 33 (62.26%) 36 18 (50.00%) 17 15 (88.24%) 38.24% 7.185** 
 >=0.1 103 54 (52.43%) 55 27 (49.09%) 48 27 (56.25%) 7.16% 0.527 
N  632 350 (55.38%) 342 163 (47.66%) 290 187 (64.48%) 16.82% 17.971** 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. N is the number of firm-years with financial reporting dates ending between 31 January 1999 and 31 December 2005 for 94 firms (655 
less 23 missing firm-years). An earnings forecast is an announcement made to the NZX pre-empting a current financial year’s earnings announcement. A firm-year is classified as a pre-reform (post-
reform) firm-year if its financial reporting date ends before (after) 1 December 2002. Earnings Change is the change in yearly earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the current 
financial year. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics
 Overall Sample Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period t-statistic (Mann Whitney z-
statistic) 
chi-square statistic 
Variables Mean (Median) 
Frequency 
(Percentage) 
Mean (Median) 
Frequency 
(Percentage) 
Mean (Median) 
Frequency 
(Percentage) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for all firm-years 
 N = 632 N = 342 N = 290  
|Earnings Change| 0.177 (0.037) 0.209 (0.040) 0.139 (0.031) -1.643^ (-1.183) 
ECHANGE -3.323 (-3.306) -3.239 (-3.214) -3.422 (-3.474) -1.351^ (-1.177) 
Total Assets (millions) 3,118.1 (200.8) 3,019.0 (170.3) 3,202.1 (229.5) 0.133 (1.141) 
SIZE 19.038 (19.118) 18.977 (18.953) 19.109 (19.252) 0.755 (1.145) 
MVBV 0.376 (0.259) 0.290 (0.164) 0.477 (0.356) 2.947** (3.057**) 
FNUM1 (350 forecasting 
firm-years) 
2.057 (2) 1.846 (2) 2.241 (2) 3.529** (3.198**) 
FNUM2 (350 forecasting 
firm-years 
0.403 (0) 0.258 (0) 0.529 (0) 3.568** (4.250**) 
FCAST1 350 (55.38%) 163 (47.66%) 187 (64.48%) 17.971** 
FCAST2 103 (16.30%) 29 (8.48%) 74 (25.52%) 35.356** 
ECSIGN 381 (60.29%) 207 (60.53%) 174 (60.00%) 0.018 
XLIST 162 (25.63%) 85 (24.85%) 77 (26.55%) 0.237 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for all earnings forecasts 
 N = 720 N = 301 N = 419  
NREVENT (non-routine) 141 (19.58%) 42 (13.95%) 99 (23.63%) 10.410** 
PRECISE1 (qualitative)  401 (55.69%) 211 (70.10%) 190 (45.35%) 48.864** 
PRECISE1 (open-ended) 71 (9.86%) 24 (7.97%) 47 (11.22%)  
PRECISE1 (range) 68 (9.44%) 11 (3.65%) 57 (13.60%)  
PRECISE1 (point) 180 (25.00%) 55 (18.27%) 125 (29.83%)  
BAD (bad news) 129 (17.92%) 51 (16.94%) 78 (18.62%) 0.333 
GOOD (good news) 451 (62.64%) 197 (65.45%) 254 (60.62%) 1.745 
FHORIZON 190 (189) 200 (212) 183.3 (171) -2.360** (-1.650^) 
FHORIZON (350 first 
earnings forecasts) 
243 (281) 243 (290) 243 (277) -0.103 (-0.121) 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all last range and point earnings forecasts 
 N = 131 N = 43 N = 88  
Error 0.083 (0.003) 0.219 (0.010) 0.017 (0.003) -1.030 (-3.659**) 
ERROR -5.628 (-5.687) -4.708 (-4.653) -6.077 (-5.884) -3.392** (-3.659**) 
PRECISE2 (point) 95 (72.52%) 35 (81.40%) 60 (68.18%) 2.531 
BAD (bad news) 42 (32.06%) 10 (23.26%) 32 (36.36%) 2.279 
GOOD (good news) 57 (43.51%) 19 (44.19%) 38 (43.18%) 0.012 
FHORIZON 100 (107) 124 (124) 89 (75) -2.317* (-1.924^) 
^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). The pre-reform period 
includes all firm-years with financial reporting dates ending between 31 January 1999 and 30 November 2002 and the post-
reform period includes all those with financial reporting dates ending between 1 December 2002 and 31 December 2005. 
|Earnings Change| is the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the 
financial year. Total Assets is the total assets at the end of the current financial year. Error is the absolute value of forecast error 
measured by the difference of forecasted and actual earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial 
year. See section 3.3 for definitions of dependent and independent variables. 
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Table 4 
Factors Associated with the Likelihood of Firms Issuing Earnings Forecasts (Overall and Non-routine) 
 Model 1 – FCAST1 Model 1 – FCAST2 
  All Firm-years Negative Earnings 
Change 
Positive Earnings 
Change 
  All Firm-
years 
Negative Earnings 
Change 
Positive Earnings 
Change 
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Expected 
Sign 
Comparison Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
 -7.264 
(0.004**) 
-6.390 
(0.023*) 
-6.610 
(0.023*)  
0/1 
 
3.372 
(0.000**) 
3.963 
(0.005**) 
2.772 
(0.018*) 
 
 
    
 
2/1 
 
-3.088 
(0.017*) 
-2.102 
(0.285) 
-3.932 
(0.023*) 
REFORM ? 
 
1.202 
(0.000**) 
1.254 
(0.002**) 
1.185 
(0.000**) 
? 
 
0/1 
 
-0.396 
(0.029*) 
-0.523 
(0.074^) 
-0.319 
(0.170) 
 
 
    ? 
 
2/1 
 
1.095 
(0.000**) 
0.637 
(0.103) 
1.481 
(0.000**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
0.019 
(0.937)   
? 
 
0/1 
 
-0.280 
(0.123)   
 
 
    ? 
 
2/1 
 
-0.244 
(0.319)   
ECHANGE + 
 
0.143 
(0.044*) 
0.045 
(0.357) 
0.220 
(0.028*) 
- 
 
0/1 
 
-0.063 
(0.124) 
-0.023 
(0.394) 
-0.093 
(0.095^) 
 
 
    + 
 
2/1 
 
0.043 
(0.278) 
0.109 
(0.162) 
-0.009 
(0.465) 
SIZE + 
 
0.408 
(0.002**) 
0.342 
(0.011*) 
0.390 
(0.007**) 
- 
 
0/1 
 
-0.169 
(0.001**) 
-0.192 
(0.006**) 
-0.157 
(0.008**) 
 
 
    + 
 
2/1 
 
0.092 
(0.088^) 
0.070 
(0.248) 
0.097 
(0.147) 
XLIST - 
 
-0.964 
(0.067^) 
-0.865 
(0.114) 
-1.114 
(0.073^) 
+ 
 
0/1 
 
0.412 
(0.041*) 
0.682 
(0.039*) 
0.237 
(0.217) 
 
 
    - 
 
2/1 
 
0.062 
(0.424) 
0.212 
(0.338) 
-0.055 
(0.450) 
MVBV + 
 
0.008 
(0.486) 
-0.026 
(0.466) 
0.131 
(0.334) 
- 
 
0/1 
 
-0.058 
(0.309) 
-0.098 
(0.292) 
-0.053 
(0.367) 
 
 
    + 
 
2/1 
 
0.129 
(0.212) 
-0.136 
(0.291) 
0.328 
(0.066^) 
lnsig2u  1.692 1.471 1.681      
sigma_u  2.330 2.086 2.318      
rho   0.623 0.570 0.620      
Likelihood ratio test  162.350** 30.700** 73.060**      
Pseudo R2       0.050 0.042 0.062 
Model Chi-square  34.510** 12.740* 20.810**   64.180** 21.690** 47.850** 
N  632 251 381   632 251 381 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Random effects logistic regression model is used where the dependent variable is 
FCAST1. Multinomial logit regression model is used where the dependent variable is FCAST2. See section 3.3 for definitions of dependent and independent variables. 
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Table 5 
Factors Associated with the Frequency of Earnings Forecasts (Overall and Non-routine) Issued by Firms 
  Model 2 – FNUM1 Model 2 – FNUM2  
  All Firm-years Negative Earnings Change Positive Earnings Change All Firm-years Negative Earnings Change Positive Earnings Change 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept  -2.392 
(0.029*) 
-2.528 
(0.029*) 
-2.084 
(0.078^) 
-6.405 
(0.000**) 
-5.803 
(0.002**) 
-6.677 
(0.001**) 
REFORM ? 
 
0.490 
(0.000**) 
0.445 
(0.002**) 
0.544 
(0.000**) 
1.042 
(0.000**) 
0.792 
(0.009**) 
1.290 
(0.000**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
0.022 
(0.781)   
-0.158 
(0.376)   
ECHANGE + 
 
0.011 
(0.356) 
-0.013 
(0.389) 
0.017 
(0.328) 
0.096 
(0.045*) 
0.072 
(0.202) 
0.074 
(0.162) 
SIZE + 
 
0.120 
(0.020*) 
0.125 
(0.022*) 
0.107 
(0.048*) 
0.246 
(0.002**) 
0.220 
(0.011*) 
0.237 
(0.012*) 
XLIST - 
 
-0.017 
(0.472) 
-0.030 
(0.458) 
-0.182 
(0.256) 
-0.342 
(0.180) 
-0.150 
(0.368) 
-0.471 
(0.157) 
MVBV + 
 
-0.077 
(0.190) 
-0.106 
(0.183) 
-0.005 
(0.481) 
0.052 
(0.367) 
-0.217 
(0.160) 
0.291 
(0.075^) 
lnalpha  -0.242 -0.479 -0.343 -0.031 -0.273 0.123 
alpha  0.786 0.620 0.710 0.970 0.761 1.131 
Likelihood ratio test  240.560** 53.400** 110.540** 39.250** 5.330** 20.670** 
Model Chi-square  46.620** 15.720** 33.920** 42.960** 12.730* 33.670** 
N  632 251 381 632 251 381 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Random effects Poisson model is used where 
the dependent variables are FNUM1 and FNUM2. See section 3.3 for definitions of dependent and independent variables. 
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Table 6 
Factors Associated with Forecast Horizon 
Model 3 – FHORIZON 
  All Forecasts Bad News Neutral News Good News 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
  
268.971 
(0.000**) 
364.418 
(0.025*) 
1.495 
(0.995) 
291.535 
(0.000**) 
REFORM ? 
 
-13.374 
(0.095^) 
-4.376 
(0.850) 
-19.421 
(0.492) 
-14.329 
(0.113) 
BAD ? 
 
-8.469 
(0.607)    
GOOD ? 
 
23.527 
(0.090^)    
ECHANGE + 
 
1.060 
(0.331) 
-5.265 
(0.227) 
-0.943 
(0.465) 
1.732 
(0.261) 
SIZE + 
 
-5.967 
(0.017*) 
-12.426 
(0.060^) 
7.754 
(0.281) 
-5.786 
(0.033*) 
XLIST + 
 
21.605 
(0.035*) 
27.871 
(0.220) 
-15.243 
(0.394) 
22.343 
(0.043*) 
MVBV ? 
 
1.366 
(0.811) 
-51.308 
(0.007**) 
18.101 
(0.525) 
7.149 
(0.246) 
FNUM1 
 
+ 
 
37.684 
(0.000**) 
46.678 
(0.000**) 
37.568 
(0.003**) 
36.573 
(0.000**) 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test  2.100    
Adjusted R2  0.256 0.319 0.194 0.223 
F-value  16.050** 4.990** 2.240^ 13.670** 
N  350 52 32 266 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Linear regression models are used where the dependent variable is FHORIZON. See section 3.3 for definitions of 
dependent and independent variables. 
 
 32
 
Table 7 
Factors Associated with Forecast Precision 
Model 4 – PRECISE1 
  All Forecasts Bad News Neutral News Good News 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
REFORM ? 
 
0.697 
(0.000**) 
1.555 
(0.000**) 
0.039 
(0.915) 
0.630 
(0.005**) 
BAD ? 
 
-0.130 
(0.604)    
GOOD ? 
 
-1.011 
(0.000**)    
ECHANGE + 
 
-0.014 
(0.392) 
-0.030 
(0.395) 
-0.177 
(0.062^) 
0.049 
(0.233) 
SIZE + 
 
-0.129 
(0.018*) 
-0.363 
(0.005**) 
-0.017 
(0.453) 
-0.092 
(0.126) 
XLIST + 
 
0.734 
(0.001**) 
0.722 
(0.099^) 
0.313 
(0.279) 
0.835 
(0.004**) 
MVBV + 
 
0.387 
(0.001**) 
-0.270 
(0.182) 
0.653 
(0.014*) 
0.479 
(0.001**) 
NREVENT + 
 
1.325 
(0.000**) 
1.623 
(0.000**) 
0.779 
(0.103) 
1.420 
(0.000**) 
FHORIZON - 
 
-0.003 
(0.001**) 
-0.001 
(0.322) 
-0.003 
(0.114) 
-0.004 
(0.002**) 
Estimated Cutpoint 1  -2.331 -6.170 0.198 -0.923 
Estimated Cutpoint 2  -1.784 -5.590 0.551 -0.265 
Estimated Cutpoint 3  -1.227 -4.633 0.874 0.287 
Pseudo R2  0.116 0.137 0.051 0.120 
Model Chi-square  187.620** 45.040** 15.830* 111.470** 
N  720 129 140 451 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Ordered logit regression model is used where the dependent variable is PRECISE1. See section 3.3 for definitions of 
dependent and independent variables. 
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Table 8 
Factors Associated with Forecast Error 
Model 5 – ERROR 
  All Forecasts Bad News Neutral News Good News 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
1.981 
(0.474) 
0.440 
(0.915) 
1.295 
(0.835) 
3.430 
(0.497) 
REFORM ? 
 
-1.136 
(0.005**) 
-0.506 
(0.493) 
-2.621 
(0.013*) 
-1.099 
(0.110) 
BAD ? 
 
-0.267 
(0.612)    
GOOD ? 
 
0.228 
(0.646)    
ECHANGE + 
 
0.319 
(0.002**) 
0.513 
(0.010**) 
-0.386 
(0.083^) 
0.549 
(0.002**) 
SIZE - 
 
-0.304 
(0.012*) 
-0.224 
(0.146) 
-0.368 
(0.123) 
-0.331 
(0.097^) 
XLIST - 
 
0.767 
(0.062^) 
0.370 
(0.334) 
0.391 
(0.371) 
0.896 
(0.127) 
MVBV ? 
 
0.244 
(0.361) 
0.612 
(0.262) 
0.928 
(0.266) 
0.166 
(0.689) 
PRECISE2 
 
+ 
 
-0.792 
(0.030*) 
-0.728 
(0.147) 
-1.176 
(0.146) 
-0.932 
(0.087^) 
FHORIZON 
 
+ 
 
0.003 
(0.071^) 
0.002 
(0.293) 
0.004 
(0.221) 
0.004 
(0.154) 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test  0.500    
Adjusted R2  0.194 0.106 0.141 0.189 
F-value  4.480** 1.690 1.730 2.860* 
N  131 42 32 57 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not 
predicted). Linear regression models are used where the dependent variable is ERROR. See section 3.3 for definitions of dependent 
and independent variables. 
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Table 9 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Tests References Results 
Interaction variables between REFORM and one of the firm-specific characteristics, 
including ECSIGN, ECHANGE, SIZE, XLIST and MVBV are included in models 1 and 2. 
Hirst et al. (2008) The coefficients of all interaction variables are insignificant. 
The results obtained do not reveal any significant differences to the main findings 
previously reported. 
ECHANGE_VOL (change in earnings per share volatility over the prior five financial 
years) is included in all five models. 
Hirst et al. (2008) The ECHANGE_VOL coefficient is positively significant in models 1 and 2 and 
negatively significant in model 3. 
Except for the ECHANGE coefficient losing its significance, other results are not 
significantly different from the main findings. 
CAPITAL_RAISING (a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm raises 
capital during the financial year and 0 otherwise) is included in models 1, 2 and 4. 
Frankel et al. (1995) The CAPITAL_RAISING coefficient is insignificant. 
Other results are not significant different from the main findings. 
Dichotomous variables for six major industry categories: (1) materials, mining or energy, 
(2) technology, telecommunication or biotechnology, (3) financial services, (4) utilities, 
airports, airlines, ports or shipping, (5) manufacturing or healthcare and (6) consumer 
staples, are included in all five models. 
Hirst et al. (2008) Firms in the financial services industry tended to release fewer earnings forecasts. Firms 
in manufacturing and healthcare industry tended to issue more earnings forecasts. None 
of other industry dichotomous variables are associated with the forecast decision. 
None of the industry dichotomous variables are significant in models 3 to 5. 
ACCURACY (a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast is ex 
post shown to be accurate and 0 otherwise). A 10 percent materiality level is applied for 
range and point earnings forecasts. 
- The results do not reveal any significant improvement in the forecast accuracy in the 
post-reform period. The imposition of a subjective materiality threshold for quantitative 
earnings forecasts might have contributed to these contradictory findings. 
CREDIBILITY (a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if firms pre-empt prior 
earnings announcements with accurate earnings forecasts and 0 otherwise) is included in 
all five models. Similar to ACCURACY, a 10 percent materiality level is applied for range 
and point earnings forecasts. 
Rogers and Stocken 
(2005) 
The forecast likelihood and frequency increased for firms with prior accurate earnings 
forecasts. Prior forecasting history had no impact on the qualitative characteristics of 
earnings forecasts made. 
Except for the REFORM coefficient in model 3 being no longer negative and 
significant, other results are consistent with the main findings. 
All five models are retested after dropping firm-years that fall within six months of the 
effective date of the reform (i.e. approximately 12 months around 1 December 2002). 
Some firms might have either responded earlier or postponed their responses depending 
on the closeness of this date to their financial reporting dates; therefore our results might 
have been influenced by such behaviour. 
Frijns et al. (2008) The results are quantitatively similar to the main findings. 
Models 3 to 5 are retested after dropping neutral news earnings forecasts. The BAD and 
GOOD variables are removed and ENEWS (a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 
for good news earnings forecasts and 0 otherwise) is included in these three models. 
Hirst et al. (2008) The results are quantitatively similar to the main findings. 
All five models are retested after dropping ASX-listed firms. ASX-listed firms also faced 
increasing legal threat during the period 2001-2004 due to the corporate disasters of the 
early 2000s leading up to the CLERP9 reform in mid-2004; therefore, these confounding 
events might have confused our results. 
Golding and Kalfus 
(2004) 
Huang et al. (2009) 
Except for model 3 where the REFORM coefficient is no longer significant, similar 
results are obtained for all models. It is possible that the decline in forecast horizon in 
the post-reform period might be attributed to ASX-listed firms. 
ANALYST (the number of analysts following the firm during the financial year) is 
included in all five models. 
Hirst et al. (2008) The ANALYST coefficient is insignificant in all five models. 
The results for the other variables remain unchanged. 
 
